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INTRODUCTION:   It is generally agreed 
that increasing agricultural productivity is 
critical to stimulating the rate of economic 
growth in Africa. There are many important 
and often complementary determinants of 
agricultural productivity. In this brief and the 
full paper it draws from, the focus is on 
fertilizer and improved seed, without 
intending to imply that they are the only or 
most significant productivity determinants. 
 
Promoting the use of fertilizer and improved 
seed involves addressing the supply and 
demand constraints that keep usage rates low, 
especially among smallholder farmers. Such 
inputs must be available, affordable, and 
profitable—for suppliers and farmers alike—
without creating untenable financial risks. 
Agricultural research, input market 
development, and direct promotion of input 
use through provision of credit and subsidized 
distribution are used to improve access to 
improved inputs and the incentive to use 
them. 
Recently, the role of input subsidies in 
stimulating growth and addressing food 
security and poverty alleviation objectives 
has re-emerged as an important agricultural 
policy debate. Sharp increases in world food 
and fertilizer prices in 2007 and 2008 have 
created a sense of urgency in meeting 
productivity and social welfare goals, and 
have put fertilizer promotion programs and 
fertilizer subsidies high on the list of options 
for government and donor responses to the 
crisis. 
 
OBJECTIVES:  The purpose of this policy 
synthesis is to highlight insights from a paper 
that draws experiences with recent fertilizer 
promotion approaches in Malawi, Zambia, 
and Kenya, involving both subsidized 
distribution and development of private sector 
input markets. The aim of this cross-country 
work is to contribute empirically based 
insights about when to invest in fertilizer 
promotion programs, including those with a 
significant subsidy element, and about how 
best to design and implement them. The full 
report draws briefly from the extensive recent 
debate about the case for and against fertilizer 
subsidies and how to make them more 
effective. It then focuses on four salient 
questions: 
•  What are the guiding principles of a 
“smart” fertilizer subsidy program, and 
what determines its costs and benefits?  
•  What has been the experience of Malawi 
and Zambia with fertilizer subsidy 
programs—their achievements and 
limitations—and what lessons can be 
drawn for the design of future subsidy 
programs that would contribute most 
effectively to national food security and 
smallholder productivity? 
•  What can be learned from Kenya’s 
experience of rapid smallholder adoption 
of fertilizer without subsidies? 
•  How do the sharply higher world food 
and fertilizer prices affect the justification 
for fertilizer subsidies in the region?   2
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR POLICY: The existence of acute 
poverty and hunger, exacerbated by soaring 
food and fertilizer prices, cries out for an 
immediate response.  
“Smart” fertilizer subsidy programs in Africa 
are attractive to many because they offer the 
potential to increase the food grain harvest 
and thus reduce hunger in the short run. 
Income gains transferred to farmers through 
the subsidy are expected to result in greater 
savings and investment in productive assets, 
contributing to longer-run growth. In 
addition, income transfers to farmers address 
the social and political objectives of poverty 
alleviation and improved equity. 
 
However, achieving these benefits depends 
greatly on how the programs are 
implemented. The contribution of fertilizer 
subsidy programs to reducing poverty and 
hunger would be higher if they could be 
designed and implemented so as to (a) target 
households with little ability to afford 
fertilizer; (b) target areas where applying 
fertilizer can actually give positive net 
economic benefits; and (c) promote rather 
than undercutting the development of a 
commercial fertilizer distribution system. 
1. CONSIDERING SUBSIDIES:  The paper 
highlights several caveats to be considered 
before choosing to implement fertilizer 
subsidies:    
a.  Fertilizer subsidies may not be the 
best option for addressing the current crisis 
of high food and fertilizer prices. Significant 
increases in demand for fertilizer are likely to 
drive up prices further (Salzburg, 2008). 
Also, the supply response to increased 
fertilizer use is not assured, given weather 
and other production risks prevalent in most 
of eastern and southern Africa. Thus, 
implementing large-scale fertilizer subsidy 
programs will not guarantee an adequate 
harvest. Lastly, subsidies targeted to 
particular crops such as maize may reduce 
area planted to other food crops such as 
cassava (Zulu et al., 2001), reducing the 
supply of alternative staple foods. 
b. As a tool for increasing overall 
agricultural productivity, especially for 
small, poor farmers, fertilizer subsidies have 
a questionable record. Long experience with 
input subsidy programs in Africa is not 
encouraging on several points: (i) there is 
very little evidence from Africa that fertilizer 
subsidies have been a sustainable or cost-
effective way to achieve agricultural 
productivity gains compared to other 
investments, (ii) there are no examples of 
subsidy programs where the benefits were not 
disproportionately captured by larger and 
relatively better-off farmers, even when 
efforts were made to target subsidies to the 
poor, and (iii) there is little evidence that 
subsidies or other intensive fertilizer 
promotion programs have “kick-started” 
productivity growth among poor farmers in 
Africa enough to sustain high levels of input 
use once the programs end. 
c. In the high potential areas of Kenya, 
Zambia, and Malawi, many if not most 
households use fertilizer regularly. In lower- 
potential zones where fertilizer is profitable, 
low or no fertilizer use by many smallholders 
is explained not just by credit constraints that 
limit acquisition, but also by the risk of crop 
failure, with resulting financial losses and 
consumption shortfalls. The lack of insurance 
causes inefficiency in production choices 
(Dercon and Christiaensen, 2007). Recent 
trials of weather-indexed insurance are a 
promising potential solution for the risk 
problem (World Bank, 2007a, p. 149). 
d. Hence, a balance is needed between 
interventions to address short-term supply 
shortages and avoid widespread hunger vs. 
investments and policies (targeted approp-
riately by region) to drive growth and lift 
poor households out of the poverty trap in 
which they are caught. Currently, the 
governments of Malawi and Zambia devote at 
least 60% of their agricultural budgets to 
input and crop marketing subsidies, leaving 
relatively little for the long-term investments 
required for sustainable reductions in poverty 
and hunger. 
2. IF PROCEEDING WITH SUBSIDY 
PROGRAMS:   For those planning to 
implement input subsidies, the experiences of   3
Zambia and Malawi provide several practical 
guidelines for how to maximize their 
effectiveness in meeting important national 
objectives other than economic growth, such 
as improved national food security, 
alleviation of poverty and hunger: 
a. Use input vouchers that can be 
redeemed at local retail stores rather than 
direct distribution in order to maintain or 
improve the capacity of the private sector 
input delivery system. 
b.  Involve a wide range of fertilizer 
importers, wholesalers, and retailers in the 
input voucher scheme,  even if it entails 
additional logistical costs. Providing tenders 
to only 2-3 firms to import fertilizer can 
entrench their position in the market, cause 
other firms to cease making investments in 
the system or drop out altogether, leading to a 
more concentrated input marketing system 
and restricted competition when the input 
subsidy program comes to an end. A system 
that allows farmers to redeem coupons at the 
full range of existing independent agro-dealer 
retail stores will promote additional 
investment in remote rural areas where it is 
most needed. By contrast, failure to involve 
the small rural retailers may lead many of 
them to stop carrying fertilizer, as was the 
case in Malawi after the 2005/06 season, 
leading to erosion rather than development of 
a private retailing system. 
c. Before deciding to target the input 
vouchers, carefully consider the objectives of 
the targeting and the practical feasibility and 
costs of implementing a targeted program, 
including personnel costs, time requirements 
and potential delays, leakage, and 
displacement of commercial sales by 
subsidized inputs. 
If the subsidy program objective is to increase 
total output, then the inputs need to reach 
farmers who can use them efficiently and on a 
large enough area to generate significant 
gains in total output. Evidence indicates that a 
high proportion of non-poor farmers are able 
to acquire fertilizer through markets so 
spending scarce government resources to 
provide them with discounted fertilizer will 
largely substitute subsidized fertilizer for 
commercial fertilizer, adding relatively little 
to overall fertilizer use or crop output. In 
some cases, small farmers may also use 
fertilizer more efficiently than larger farmers. 
If the subsidy program objective is to 
alleviate poverty, or to overcome liquidity 
constraints for poor farmers who would 
otherwise be unable to purchase fertilizer, 
then it must be possible to identify poor 
farmers, and socially acceptable to channel 
vouchers to them, at a reasonable cost 
including leakage. Assisting low-income 
households to acquire fertilizer or other 
inputs, especially in a high food price 
environment, may make the difference 
between their ability to eat and going hungry. 
Providing crop production support to 
relatively asset-poor households also 
contributes importantly to equity and social 
protection objectives, 
If effective targeting does not seem feasible 
or achievable at an acceptable cost, then a 
small universal voucher program would be 
worth considering. For example, a program 
designed to provide all farmers with inputs 
for 0.2 ha would primarily benefit small 
farmers while at the same time limiting the 
displacement of commercial purchases by 
larger higher-income farmers, some degree of 
which might occur anyway under a program 
that fails to target small farmers successfully. 
d.  Address infrastructure and input 
supply constraints as well as improving 
procurement efficiency (joint procurement 
arrangements and regional procurement 
hubs).  This will help achieve the goal of 
enhancing farm-level fertilizer supplies at a 
lower price. Facilitating the movement of 
fertilizers across borders (removing customs 
duties and export taxes) will also contribute 
to overall improvements in supply efficiency. 
3. OTHER BUILDING BLOCKS OF 
IMPROVED FERTILIZER USE: Whether 
fertilizer subsidy programs are implemented 
or not, the following investments and policies 
are important for attacking the underlying 
fundamental constraints to obtaining a high 
economic and social payoff to improved 
fertilizer use.  
a.  Facilitate private sector partnerships 
with farmers, such as through contract   4
farming where conditions are suitable, would 
go a long way toward reducing the financial 
burden on government.  
b.  Strengthen farmers’ effective demand 
for fertilizer  by making fertilizer use 
profitable and by building durable input and 
output markets that can absorb the 
increased output without gluts that depress 
producer prices.  This involves two major 
commitments from government: 
•  To increase farmers’ demand for 
fertilizer, governments should invest in 
rural infrastructure, efficient port facilities 
and standards of commerce to reduce the 
costs of distribution; fund agricultural 
research to produce seeds that respond to 
fertilizer; determine and disseminate 
fertilizer use recommendations that are 
appropriate for different areas (as opposed 
to one blanket recommendation for an 
entire country); and nurture the 
development of rural financial systems, 
market information systems, institutions for 
contract enforcement, and telecommuni-
cations to attract new investments by 
commodity marketing firms. These “public 
goods” investments, often considered 
outside the scope of fertilizer marketing 
policy, nevertheless strongly affect the 
demand for fertilizer and hence whether 
sustainable markets for fertilizer can arise. 
•  To build durable input and output 
markets, governments should establish a 
supportive policy environment that attracts 
local and foreign direct investment The 
case of Kenya shows how a stable policy 
environment has induced an impressive 
private sector response that has helped to 
make fertilizer accessible to most small 
farmers. Importantly, this has involved 
reforms to the financial market (elimination 
of foreign exchange controls) as well as to 
fertilizer and crop markets. In other 
countries, the implementation of large 
subsidy programs has inhibited the type of 
private investment response seen in Kenya, 
due to the risk of huge losses that subsidy 
programs inflict on commercial input 
dealers. 
c.  Increase fertilizer use efficiency by 
promoting farmers’ use of improved crop 
management practices such as crop rotation 
with legumes, changes in density and spacing 
patterns of seeds and placement of fertilizer 
and seeds at planting (FIPS Africa, 2008), 
improved soil organic matter, early planting, 
timely weeding, applying fertilizer in 
response to rainfall (Snapp, Blackie, and 
Donovan, 2003; Blackie et al., 2006), water 
harvesting, and other conservation farming 
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